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CREATIVE INTERCHANGE BETWEEN
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY:
A CALL TO DIALOGUE
William D. Eisenhower

A novel situation has been created by the sympathetic treatment present-day
philosophers are giving traditional Christian themes. What does this mean
for the relationship between philosophy and theology? I begin my answer by
defining terms and comparing two articles on methodology, one by a philosopher, the other by a theologian. Next I identify four conditions which must
be met for creative interchange between the two disciplines to take place. I
conclude with a critique of Gordon Kaufman's recent call for dialogue in
Faith and Philosophy, finding that it fails to satisfy the conditions I have
specified.

Reinhold Niebuhr once observed that if a Christian theologian were invited
to deliver a lecture at Columbia University, the philosophy department would
be outraged. The remark serves as a reminder of a mutual antipathy which
existed not too many years ago. But now the climate is changing. Certainly
there are still those who view theology as arcane nonsense, and their counterparts who see philosophy as an attempt to play God. Nevertheless, a novel
situation has been created by the resurgence of Christian faith and the renewed interest in the philosophy of religion in philosophical circles. Speaking
as a theologian, it seems obvious that it is time for the dividing wall of
hostility to come down so that philosophers and theologians can learn from
each other.
The two disciplines have always been what John E. Smith calls "near
relations," their overlap creating a context for mutual enrichment, but also
for internecine antagonism.· We have seen the latter through most of the
twentieth century. As a consequence, many theologians would be surprised
at the turn toward belief some of their near relations have made in recent
years. Religious topics are receiving explication from an unexpected quarter.
Philosophy has taken off its shoes and is standing on holy ground. What does
this mean for its relationship to theology?
It could mean that conversations take place with one discipline assuming
a dominant role. But this would mean that the dividing wall had not really
come down. Another option involves creative interchange between the two,
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with each discipline making an equal contribution. In what follows, I contend
for the viability of this option by comparing two similar approaches to a
critical methodological issue. Next I identify four conditions which must be
met for creativity to be released. This is important lest one party or the other
participate in a dialogue in which all contributors are equal but some are more
equal than others. To illustrate this peril, I conclude with an examination of
remarks addressed to philosophers by theologian Gordon Kaufman. 2 However, at the outset it is important to define a few key terms.

Critical Terminology
Creative interchange refers to that kind of communication which is most
appropriate for discussing matters of great significance for human living. 3 It
is conversation in which the unique features of divergent points of view are
confirmed even as they qualify and enrich those of others. This means that
affirmation has to accompany correction, to the end that all participants
become at once more self-critical, and more self-esteeming. In such a process,
creativity will be released to the extent that perspectives in conversation
approximate an optimum balance between common and divergent reference
points. Dialogue would not be creative, according to this understanding, when
matters under discussion have little direct bearing on human living, nor when
participants hold most things in common at the outset, nor again when disagreements are so pronounced or conversation partners so partial that little
common ground can be agreed upon. I am convinced that the present hour
offers more congenial prospects for creative interchange between philosophers and theologians than any time in recent memory.
But if so, it is important to define the terms "philosophy" and "theology."
No doubt some readers will find this unnecessary. Don't we already know
what each discipline involves? Perhaps so, but it is worth considering that
the opportunities of the moment require that this entire matter be rethought
from the ground up.
One place to being is with an analogy from a theologian of the Chicago
School, Henry Nelson Wieman.
If religion is like eating, then the reality which interests the religious person
is analogous to food. In that case the theologian is the one who puts this food
into such fonn that it is palatable and can most readily be eaten. The theologian is a good cook. But the philosopher is a dietician. He does not present
God in a fonn that is digestible to the ordinary religious person. That is not
his business. . . . The theologian talks about beefsteak and lettuce. The
philosopher talks about starches and calories. 4

For Wieman, theology ensures the intellectual. integrity of religious devotion
in order to make it rationally acceptable to persons of faith. Philosophy, by
contrast, tests the assumptions on which this devotion rests. It seeks to de-
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termine the essential characteristics, if there be any, of the reality devotion
directs itself to. S
I take Wieman's analogy further in contending that in order to be responsible cooks, it is important for theologians to partake of the meals they
prepare, and to align themselves with a particular restaurant. This means that
theologians are required to have religiously confronted the sacral reality they
speak of and to have committed themselves to the ongoing life of the Church.
To put the matter as simply as possible, according to this view, reflection
which does not begin with faith in God and end with a concern for the fate
of the Church is not Christian theology.
This could hardly be true for philosophy. A dietician is not called upon to
prepare anything for consumption. There is no requirement that he or she be
personally familiar with how something tastes, nor with how it fares in an
eating establishment. A philosopher analyzing faith, for instance, is not required to be a person of faith, nor to be related to a community of faith.
Clearly, the philosopher has a measure of freedom not available to the
theologian-but there is a trade-off. For one thing, to the non-philosopher,
many philosophical treatises on religious issues seem rather abstract, because
the qualities of personal investment and communal significance are not present. When they are, philosophy merges into theology. Perhaps this very thing
has been taking place in recent years. If so, it would explain an observation
of William Lane Craig. "Today the Christian seeking after truth will probably
learn more about the attributes of God from the works of Christian philosophers than from those of Christian theologians."6 In terms of the analogy we
are using, this would mean that the dieticians are now behaving more like
cooks than the cooks themselves. However, for dialogue to be productive, it
is important not to make blanket claims about who is better than whom, but
rather to notice that we are now close enough to begin a sustained process
of listening and learning.

A Comparison
Consider two articles on methodology, one by philosopher James Keller,
the other by theologian Douglas OttatL7 Keller writes in response to an article
by Alvin Plantinga. 8 The latter had stressed that Christian philosophers should
undertake philosophical reflection in light of their Christian beliefs, not in
light of contrary beliefs of the philosophicalluminaries. 9 Keller feels that this
raises without answering the question of how what he calls "secular beliefs"
are related to "Christian beliefs. "10 He maintains that the former play an
indispensable role in helping to define, clarify, and challenge interpretations
of the latter.l1 Their relationship is a dialectical one, meaning that neither
category receives automatic preeminence. "Sometimes Christian beliefs
should be given precedence, but sometimes secular beliefs should be, even
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when these have the consequence of implying the falsity of some Christian
beliefs. "12 Against the charge that this could occasion the denial of one's faith,
Keller argues that sheltering theological tenets from criticism is at least as
likely to make one less faithful. This claim seems to have three warrants.
First, such beliefs are the products of an all-too-finite-and-fragmented community and should not be excused from rational scrutiny. Second, "always to
give the precedence to any of this group's beliefs over all of those of one's
current culture would forever block any hope of gaining from that culture
any critical insight into one's beliefs that might lead one to a more correct
understanding of Christianity and of God's Will."13 Third, such critical insight
is not likely to emerge from the theological tenets alone.
Keller's case rests on two convictions. The first is that doctrine develops.
The second is that Christians are obligated to adopt an increasingly more
adequate set of beliefs as it becomes possible to do so. His word of choice
to denote adequacy is "correct." Responsible faith requires us to ask about
"the correct way to understand the Christian faith" and "to criticize our
current understanding" of it. 14 The force of these two convictions stems from
Keller's awareness of Christian circles in which modes of inquiry which
might undermine official doctrine are forbidden. IS He feels constrained to
warn his colleagues against steps which lead in this direction. "Always to
reject any philosophical techniques or beliefs because they yield conclusions inconsistent with one's current Christian beliefs would be to make too
strong an assumption about the correctness of one's current understanding of
Christianity. "16
Ottati's article begins with the observation that the cumulative increase in
scientific understanding requires that theology come to terms with the findings of other disciplines. 17 Thus, right from the start we have a distinction
which roughly parallels Keller's two categories of belief. In place of Keller's
dialectical relationship, however, Ottati contends that "Christian theology is
concerned to communicate Christian faith with integrity and intelligibility. "18
By "integrity" Ottati means that faith is presented in a way which maintains
the distinctive features of the Church's conceptual structure. By "intelligibility" he means that faith is communicated in a way which rings true to the
experience of the contemporary listener, which means in turn that it takes
account of interpretations arising from other fields of inquiry: philosophy,
psychology, and sociology, to name but three. Thus integrity and intelligibility are the dual requirements for theological adequacy. They function to
preserve the distinctiveness of Christianity's message while opening it to
encounters with other disciplines. 19
Ottati notes that when the standard of integrity is ignored-that is, when
traditional symbols and categories are not a fundamental influence in theological construction-the price is steep. First, it is not likely that theology
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will offer the community of faith any help in locating the same sovereign
reality that earlier communities trusted in, let alone in grasping its purposes
for the present. 20 Second, it is also unlikely that theology will bring to light
anything in human experience other than what secular men an women already
find there. 21 When the standard of intelligibility is ignored-that is, when
thinking about God is not permitted to consider mundane experience-there
are other dangers. One is that experience is bifurcated into mutually exclusive
realms, one open to God, the other closed. But if this is the case then the
effort to protect the integrity of our thinking about God from the corrosive
effects of other perspectives deprives us of the thing we sought to save:
classical theology's God, the sovereign Lord of every dimension of human
life. 22 What is more, "present experience, and reflection about it, lacks proximity to God that allows it to function as a critical check on the interpretations
of the apostolic communities. "23
This review of the two articles is all too brief. But a few items for comparison have come into focus. Many might have thought that methodology
would be the least likely point at which philosophers and theologians could
profit from each other. Much to the contrary, we see that Keller and Ottati
are in the same ballpark, perhaps even on the same team. It is reasonable to
assume that the mutual influence of the perspectives they represent would be
creative because of the balance between the similarities and differences in
the arguments they marshall. The similarities are there because each offers a
both/and approach to Christianity and nonchristian sources of human understanding, and because each is convinced that the latter offers the former an
indispensable means of self-criticism.
This makes their differences all the more interesting. Keller's heavy use of
the word "correct" implies a tighter standard than Ottati's dual requirements
do. Keller construes faith's conceptual content as so many isolated units of
belief, whereas Ottati's construal has a broader sweep to it, one which takes
too much for granted the notion that there is a distinctiveness to Christianity
which, if not self-evident, is at the very least a matter of wide agreement.
Furthermore, Keller's proposal seems to call for a case-by-case consideration
of Christian beliefs-so that the ones determined to be wrong can be set right.
Ottati's would seems to require formulations which are no longer compelling
to drop quietly out of sight.
The point not to be missed, however, is that their points of divergence are
formally related to a more fundamental contrast. Keller is concerned about
faith as an individual commits to it. Ottati is speaking about faith as it is
communicated. A world of difference opens up at this point. Ottati, the theologian, sees reflection on faith's conceptual content as internally related to
the Church's call to proclaim it. Yesterday's proclamation enabled the Church
to relate itself to sacral reality with some measure of success. It is the
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theologian's job to see that today's is equally effective. Keller, the philosopher, does not mention any concern he might have regarding the impact his
remarks will have on the Church-nor should he. In fact, according to the
view argued here, it is this concern for the fate of the Church which separates
the theologian from the philosopher, and which has to be borne in mind during
encounters between them.

Four Conditions
As this comparison demonstrates, philosophy and theology are in comfortable speaking distance of one another. But for encounters between a Keller
and an Ottati to release creativity's full potential, four conditions must be
met. First, definitions of key terms must be offered at the outset. Second,
each participant must acknowledge that the inherently new context in which
the dialogue is taking place makes this kind of initial caution necessary.
Third, each must recognize that creativity is hindered when the premises
according to which the interchange is to evolve are stipulated in advanceespecially when they are stipulated unilaterally. Finally each participant must
confront the fact that entering a dialogue without imposing terms on the other
requires trust in the goodness of creative interchange. Dialogue can be creative only where it draws courage from religious faith-however unthematized-in an availability of grace sufficient to hold in check the anxiety
which creative advances invariably produce.
These conditions are important enough to warrant expanded treatment.
The meanings of terms like "philosophy" and "theology" are not on file
somewhere, needing only to be drawn out and reviewed from time to time. They
have to be established anew in each generation. The promise of creative interchange is that philosophers will gain new insights into theology, and their own
discipline as well, by hearing how theologians see the two-and vice versa.
To this end, I began with a theologian's view of what distinguishes the two.
This view owes something to Barth, and something to Wieman. I believe
with Barth that Christian theology is inexorably tied to the Christian Church.
However, the new situation in philosophy makes Barth's reputation of it
untenable. Thus I follow Wieman in believing that philosophy and theology
need one another.
This is why I find Wieman's analogy helpful. The philosopher and the
theologian both seek to make reality intelligible, just as the dietician and the
cook both work with food. But what sets the cook apart from the dietician is not
merely a matter of vocabulary, although this is as far as Wieman explicated the
matter: the one confined to traditional terminology, "beefsteak and lettuce"; the
other free to develop more technical terms, "starches and calories". The more
profound point is that the cook prepares fare for consumption by the general
public, whereas the dietician qua dietician does not. It seems to me that the
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analogy asks for a Barthian twist which Wieman did not give it: the theologian
must be a person of faith who relates faith issues to a community of faith.
But why should this be? The answer is that theology exists for the Church
to ensure that when the faithful gather, their pastors can confidently affirm
something worth affirming. If they cannot, the flock will wander off to other
pastures where other shepherds speak with conviction, perhaps ill-advisedly.
The danger of the Church going out of business by losing confidence in the
saving significance of its message-this is not an extraneous concern for theology. Just as chef and restaurant share one fate, so do theologian and Church.
The same challenges which face the Church confront the scholars who
superintend its message. Take for instance a reality which neither can escape:
Sunday morning. With unfaltering regularity Sunday arrives, bringing the
faithful together to hear about God. Theology'S assignment is to see that they
do not go away hungry. Other interests can never interfere with this primary
task. Why not? The answer is simple: Good News delayed is Good News
denied. Either God is alive in the present moment, or Sunday morning worship loses its meaning. When the meaning leaves, so do the people. Other
gospels commandeer their allegiance. This means that a burdensome sense
of urgency pervades the theological enterprise. It is, in fact, a constituent part
of the discipline, and when it is lost, reflection ceases to be theological.
Like many disciplines, theology answers a host of questions, some of which
are closer to its heart than others. Theology's primary questions arise from
the declaration, "The Kingdom of God is at hand." Who is this God? What
is thil> Kingdom? Is it for me? How can I be sure? On what basis? What must
I do to inherit it? These primary subjects for investigation have to do with
what Stephen Ely called the "religious availability" of God.2~ They are the
questions preachers are called to major in. Theology is under a time constraint
because it is answerable to these preachers and the regularly assembling
congregations they serve.
Now then. Secondary concerns enter the picture very quickly. They arise
from various sources. There are the claims from the secular world as lifted
up by Keller and Ottati, the teachings of the other world religions, and the
Church's long history of reflection. How is all this related to the gospel from
which the Church draws its life? Fascinating issues surface here. The challenge facing the theologian is to articulate answers to the secondary questions
in ways which bring attention back to the driving concerns which prompted
them in the first place.
Not all of the issues surrounding the religious availability of God's grace
can be resolved from one Sunday to the next, nor even in a single lifetime.
No matter. Theology calls women and men to commitment on the basis of an
understanding which is sufficient for this purpose, but which includes within
itself the recognition that much remains unsettled.
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Thus there is a "leap of faith" element in theology, and it persists even after
the Church has disappeared from view. Religious scholars who have little
interest in the relevance their thought has for communities of faith are nevertheless notorious for prematurely closing off discussion of fundamental
issues. For instance, one does not have to look too far to find theologians
whose efforts to relate faith to philosophy take the form of an argument that
this philosopher, and this one alone, provides Christian faith with the overarching vision it sorely needs. This is confusing to philosophers, who can
only scratch their heads and ask, "Why Whitehead of all people?" Why,
indeed, when there are so many philosophers to choose from? The answer is
that theology's perennial impatience persists after the commitment which
engendered it has disappeared. One could say, a theologian is a philosopher
in a hurry.
But if their misuse of philosophy is unfortunate, the impatience which
prompts it may not be. In the words of theologian Daniel Day Williams,
Christianity does not ... have to wait until philosophers have come to a
decision on the validity, say, of the ontological argument (when will that be?)
before Christians can say they have knowledge of the God who is the living
reality of creative and redemptive love in our midst. 26

Even so, the willingness of theologians to rush in where philosophers take
their time means that theological understanding cannot escape its signature
quality of being an apprehensive comprehension, for it is always possible that
concerns which were set aside in the interest of giving the Church something
to say will prove the undoing of those which were not. Quite simply, for the
theologian, there is no way to avoid being apprehensive. The choice is to
include one's uneasiness within the circle of theological reflection, or to
ignore it and be ruled by it.
Philosophers are not subject to theological anxiety. Their discipline does
not concern itself with the fate of the Christian Church and the time constraint
life from one Sunday to the next produces. As a consequence, a theologian
monitoring a philosophical discussion which addresses a matter of religious
concern notices the differences. The question has lost something of its urgency, lost its direct connection to personal faith, lost its immediate relevance
to the religious community, and lost its requirement that the discussion be
accessible to "the ordinary religious person" (Wieman's phrase). But he or
she also sees an obvious gain: unhurried, unrestrained opportunity. No one
feels that the matter must receive a final determination by this Sunday, or
ever for that matter.
Consider the question of the traditional concerns of each discipline. With
theology, these arise out of the proclamation of the Kingdom of God, whereas
with philosophy, they grow out of attempts to gain insight into the nature of
reality by asking about its most fundamental and general characteristics.
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Theology dies when it abandons its traditional concerns. This is not true of
philosophy. There is nothing to say philosophers cannot dispense with metaphysics, ethics, and the philosophy of religion in order to restrict themselves
to logic, linguistic analysis, and epistemology. These may dominate attention
indefinitely.
When they care to, philosophers can take up questions like the uniqueness
of Christianity, the nature of faith, reason and revelation, or any other topic
which might popularly be associated with theology. When they do, some
observers will be hard pressed to distinguish the philosopher from the theologian. The question to ask is: is this person functioning as a cook or as a
dietician? The former will take up such issues as matters of personal concern
in order to mediate the availability of the Living God to the on-going life of
the Church. The latter will not. Thus, in place of the apprehensive comprehension of theology, we have the comprehensive apprehension of philosophy,
that is, the widest possible mental grasp of life in all its facets. Complex
issues are not prematurely resolved; faith can be investigated from the outside; no religious community hangs in the balance; and it is not necessary
that religious issues be construed in such a way as to make their discussion
intelligible to the educated lay person.2'
No doubt my endeavor to place philosophy and theology in relation to each
other falls short in certain respects. I offer it as one person's attempt to
address the first of the conditions which must be satisfied for creative interchange to take place. Unless conversations begin here, the results can be very
confusing, a point which will be clearer when we tum to Gordon Kaufman's
call to dialogue.

The New Situation
The second condition requires participants to recognize the turn philosophers at the end of the twentieth century have made toward the Christian
tradition. This may be difficult for some theologians. Generations of seminary
students have regarded philosophy with suspicion if not outright contempt.
Diogenes Allen identifies "three streams" which have fed this long-standing
negative attitude. 28 "One stream may be represented by Karl Barth.... The
other two springs are nineteenth and twentieth century biblical studies and
work in the history of doctrine, especially that of Adolph Harnack. "29 One
could add that for a number of years, Philosophy la courses have not typically
been taught in a way which highlighted the discipline's compatibility with
Christian truth-claims. Allen also points out that "the discipline of philosophy
today, especially in the English-speaking world, is so remote from theology
that it takes prolonged study of philosophy before one's theological understanding is enhanced to a significant degree. "30
Be that as it may, the theologian reading Faith and Philosophy may be
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surprised to discover topics which have been abandoned in some theological
circles: creation ex nihilo, the Trinity, the Resurrection, revelation, faith, and
prayer, to name but a few. He or she will most likely see this as a radically
new state of affairs, and come to the conclusion that it is quite simply no
longer possible to regard the relationship between the two diciplines with the
assumptions of the past. The thought may even occur that faith and unbelief
have traded comers. But the point is that if conversations between philosophers and theologians are to be productive, this new set of circumstances has
to be recognized.
Thus it is imperative that neither side seek to stipulate in advance the
conditions according to which they shall proceed. Theology has its own
integrity, to use Ottati's word, as does philosophy-integrity which would be
violated by imposition from another quarter. If creative interchange is going
to be genuine, this means the outcome will be unpredictable. New understandings will be authentically new to the extent that participants release the
dialogue to shape itself out of what each party contributes.
But this is easier said than done. Territorial impulses too often appear
disguised as the desire to conserve hard-won advances. Parochial insights
masquerade as universal truths. The new understandings which creative interchange makes possible inevitably require that former perspectives be modified, something which rarely takes place without a sense of personal loss.
We have to be broken in order to go forward, a point Wieman insisted upon.
We must be broken because there is a good so great that it breaks the bounds
of our littleness. We must be broken because there is a power which works
in our lives to achieve a good we cannot compass and cannot discern, until
some later time in retrospect reveals the form of the new creation now invisibly emerging. Our own anticipatory vision is always too narrow, biased, and
self-centered to comprehend it. 3 !

No doubt most of us would prefer to enlarge our understanding without
having to lose anything along the way. Thus we are tempted to forestall the
transcending of present perspective by exerting as much control as possibleas in dictating the terms of an encounter ahead of time.
But a genuine encounter is an adventure. Risk is not avoided but embraced
in the conviction that creative interchange more than compensates for what
has to be set aside. Even so, there are no guarantees. Perhaps it would be
better for the philosopher or theologian who cannot enter into an encounter
with a measure of openness and trust not to share in one at all.
Yet if perfect trust is required few of us would qualify. Thus it seems
preferable to ask participants to search their hearts, to become self-critical of
their resistance to change, and to cultivate a healthy appreciation for the role
sacral reality plays in any significant endeavor. In conversations about ultimate issues, if anything worthwhile emerges it will do so despite the oppo-
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sition we are inclined to muster and because of a power which surpasses ours,
and which is capable of creating "a kingdom of goodness in depth and height
and scope so far beyond the reach of any human plan that it must not be
constricted to our imposed directive. "32
We have come to the fourth condition required for the promise interchange
holds to be fulfilled: trust in the availability of grace. Faith in grace is
necessary because without it anxiety will frustrate our attempts to reach
across from one field of expertise to another. Faith in grace is necessary
because otherwise every invitation to rise above a reigning philosophical or
theological paradigm will be perceived as a temptation to fall below it. Faith
in grace is necessary if the misgivings of the heart are to be quieted sufficiently to allow new perspectives to emerge. It is appropriate for a theologian
to suggest: dialogue does not have to wait until grace is defined fully or in
such a way as to satisfy all comers. All that is required is that those in
conversation reckon with the benevolence at work in encounters of significance which is capable of bringing us to a new level of understanding which
at present we cannot envisage.
Consider the alternative: philosophers and theologians discussing issues of
religious import while harboring grave doubts as to whether a source of
goodness works in and among us. Representatives of theology, as I have
defined it, would find such a prospect a horrible incongruity. We would hope
that others could see that this kind of conversation drains religious issues of
whatever saving significance makes them worth discussing and restricts
creativity's capacity to engender novel ways of construing them. If this is not
widely accepted, then a serious impediment to creative interchange needs to
be faced. In as much as it is dialogue between Christians which is under
consideration, this point about grace may not need to be argued further.

Critiquing a Call for Dialogue
I have presented the four conditions which must be met to ensure that
encounters between philosophy and theology will be productive. While not
the final word on the matter (how could they be?) I believe we now have a
place to begin which is sufficient for analyzing other calls for dialogue.
In "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordon Kaufman directs our
attention to the need for dialogue. "Philosophical reflection is indispensable for
theology; and theological reflection may have some important insights to offer
philosophers. "33 We can be grateful to Kaufman for putting this issue on the
table, for doing so in a way which presents a valuable overview of the problems
confronting religious belief at the end of the present century, and for including
a compelling reminder that "if we try to overcome and control the mystery within
which we live ... we sin against God. "34 What is more, his article illustrates
the apprehensiveness of theology which I have characterized above.
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Kaufman argues that present-day philosophical discussions of evidentialism are not of much use to contemporary theology. He explains that the
Judeo-Christian tradition long embodied a certain kind of evidentialism from
its inception forward. All along it drew on the conviction that evidence for
the reality and activity of God could be found in history and experience. The
problem is that contemporary theologians do not share this conviction because of factors which have forced a "shift in interest and attention."3S
Kaufman's final point is that there is an irreducible element of mystery
discoverable in human experience, and that "the debate focusing on
'evidences' for this or that particular detail in traditional beliefs about God
are simply failing to notice or take account of the depths of this mystery
within which we humans live. "36 Thus Kaufman's problem is not really with
evidentialism-he makes appeals to history and experience, too-but with
the traditional categories which obscure the true nature of the reality which
the evidence actually discloses, that being "inscrutable Mystery. "37 His call
for theologians and philosophers to learn from each other needs to be seen
in relation to his objection to traditional theism, and not merely in relation
to the narrower topic in which he couches it.
I have argued that encounters between philosophy and theology must satisfy four conditions if they are to be useful. Kaufman's call for dialogue fails
to satisfy any of them. First of all, he fails to begin by defining his terms.
Neglecting to position theology and philosophy in relation to each other has
several serious consequences, the chief of which is that his understanding of
theology is not under his control. Kaufman argues that Christian theologians
"have been driven" by religious pluralism, new theories about the influence
conceptual framework and symbolic expression have on experience and
thought, and the unprecedented evils of the twentieth century into a state of
deep-seated suspicion toward their own tradition. 38 Yet, surely it is fair to
ask, Why have the theologians been driven thus, if many philosophers have
not been? Are we to assume that theologians are more sensitive to these
concerns than philosophers? Or is it possible that the problems they pose are
not sufficient to invalidate faith as he believes? Philosophers have chosen to
affirm traditional Christianity during the same period that the theologians
Kaufman represents have experienced their "shift in interest and attention."
Thus it is self-evident that traditional categories continue to attract a religious
response-even in the face of the issues that Kaufman highlights. If these
issues are not as determinative as Kaufman maintains, this means that his
skepticism draws some of its strength from other factors-ones of which he
is unaware. I submit that anyone thinking through the relationship between
the two disciplines could not read Kaufman's article without coming across
the objection I am rising. If he had defined his terms, he would have had a
firmer grasp on his material.
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From my perspective, the key feature distinguishing theology from philosophy is the sense of mission in the former, one characterized by an urgency
to bring ultimate issues to some sort of resolution. But this is the very thing
which Kaufman argues against. Behind this, one assumes that theology's
essential connection to the Christian Church is missing as well. With all due
respect, it has to be asked if he is speaking as a theologian at all. No doubt
he is from his perspective-but here again we see why it is imperative to define
one's terms. By failing to do so, Kaufman leaves his readers in the dark.
There are no definitions of terms, we can suppose, because Kaufman did
not think it was necessary. Surely philosophy is whatever the philosophers
happen to be doing, just as theology is the same. But unfortunately, Kaufman
neglects to reckon with the interest in religious issues generally, and the
embracing of Christian concepts specifically, among the audience his article
addresses. Thus he fails to satisfy the second condition.
Even supposing that his audience were making a colossal mistake, there
are reasons for greeting it with a measure of provisional acceptance. Any
conversation-to be successful-requires that participants grant one another
the right to stand where they do. But beyond this point of good manners, we
theologians need to ask ourselves, Is it possible that there are good philosophical reasons behind the turn toward the Christian tradition our near relations have made? If this is at least conceivable, and I believe that it is, then
we have all the more reason to hold our criticisms at bay.
But this is self-restraint which Kaufman is not willing to exercise. Instead
of seeing the resurgence of belief among philosophers as an advance which
creates new opportunities for mutual interaction, he takes it as a puzzling
condition which impedes it. Puzzling and wrong-headed. Philosophers now
"trivialize the very ideas and beliefs which they are seeking to explore and
understand. "39 To his mind, theologians have avoided this by adopting a more
judicious stance. "Today we are forced to take with greater seriousness the
fact that we do not know, and that we can see no way in which we will ever
be able to plumb, the true meaning of human life-or whether there even is
such a thing. "40
Kaufman is not explicit as he sets the terms which philosophers must accept
in order to participate in advanced theological discussions. But his central
stipulation is hard to miss: give up your traditional Christianity! This imposition on philosophy violates the third of the conditions I have presented. It
has several unfortunate consequences. It restricts the opportunities creative
interchange will have to produce genuinely novel understandings. It allows
philosophers no freedom to answer, and thus no sense of ownership in what
transpires. It communicates no willingness to meet halfway, and thus no real
desire to listen as well as to speak. And finally, it demonstrates theology's
perennial impatience, but to no good effect.
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If a genuine encounter is to take place, participants on both sides will have
to demonstrate a measure of trust in the power of creative interchange to
replace good perspectives with better ones. Since loss of perspective is a
stress-inducing experience, one which can only be endured by faith, it is
essential that we trust that grace works wherever creative advance is under
way. Few of us will have the courage to work out our salvation in fear and
trembling unless we are convinced that God works in us to will and to act
according to his good purpose.
As I noted earlier, Kaufman scores high marks for his compelling argument
associating sin with the chronic human tendency to control the mystery which
surrounds us. But the evidence of sin he finds on our side is not matched by
evidence of grace on mystery's side. This creates a theologically untenable
position, for there is no doctrine of sin which can survive for long without
being connected in some way or another to a doctrine of grace. There are
philosophical problems as well: he is a theologian anxious to resolve things
by claiming there is no resolution. But the absence of a doctrine of grace is
his principal problem. It accounts for his lack of trust in creative interchange,
which in turn explains the unreasonable demand he thrusts on those with
whom he seeks to communicate.

In Conclusion
Theology and philosophy have been in dialogue for two millennia. As we
move toward the third, a new situation has come into being. The fact that
philosophers are interested in religious questions should be welcomed by
theologians. If answers are couched in traditional categories-it is not
theology's place to criticize. To the contrary, this could help theology answer
more of the questions it faces without losing its constitutive sense of urgency.
In fact, the chances have seldom been better for the encounter between the
two to prove beneficial to both.
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